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A
modern central bank seeks to maintain a ﬁnancial environment within
which competitive markets support the efﬁcient use of productive
resources. The overarching principle is that a central bank should
provide the necessary monetary and ﬁnancial stability in a way that leaves the
maximum freedom of action to private markets. In keeping with this principle,
monetary policy is implemented by indirect means, with an interest rate policy
instrument rather than with direct credit controls. In the banking sphere every
effort is made to minimize as far as possible the regulatory burden associated
with ﬁnancial oversight.
The principle that markets should be given free reign wherever possible
creates three difﬁculties of understanding that a central bank must overcome
in order to carry out its policies effectively. The presumption that monetary
and banking policies are best when they are as unobtrusive as possible creates
the ﬁrst difﬁculty. Inevitably, central banks seem shadowy and distant from
the public’s point of view. Yet, to work well, central bank policies need to
shape the expectations of households and businesses. Monetary policy encour-
ages economic growth and stabilizes employment over the business cycle by
anchoring inﬂation and inﬂation expectations. Bank supervision and regulation
aims to promote conﬁdence in the banking system.
This article is reprinted as it appeared in the Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Pub-
lic Policy, volume 51, number 1, with permission from Elsevier Science. It also appeared
in the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond 1999 Annual Report. The article beneﬁted from
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and at the Bank of Italy, IGIER, Paolo Bafﬁ conference on “Monetary Policy of the ESCB:
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and Mark Wynne provided helpful comments. The views are the author’s and not necessarily
those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
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The need to inﬂuence expectations and promote conﬁdence puts a pre-
mium on credibility, a commitment to goals, and a central bank’s perceived
independence and competence to achieve its objectives. Thus, a central bank
must create in the public’s mind an understanding of the methods by which its
objectives can be sustained. This formidable problem has to be overcome in
spite of the fact that a central bank operates in the background, with obscure
methods and procedures.
The second and third difﬁculties arise because central bankers must un-
derstand markets. Dynamic markets introduce evermore efﬁcient productive
technologies and create new goods and services to better satisfy consumer
wants. Economic dynamism complicates the measurement of macroeconomic
conditions. A central bank seeks to understand the latest market developments
in order to implement monetary and banking policies appropriately. Policy
actions are inevitably benchmarked against historical correlations in data. Yet
a central bank must be prepared to question its interpretation of data in light of
anecdotal and other information that suggests behavior different from historical
averages.
The third difﬁculty of understanding is in the area of economic analysis.
Because policies inﬂuence economic activity indirectly, central bankers must
use economic analysis to think about how their policies are transmitted to
the economy. Some sort of quantitative theoretical model must be used to
think about how markets respond to monetary and banking policies, and how
monetary and banking policies ought to react to the economy.
The role of regional banks in a system of central banks is about creating un-
derstanding in the three senses described above. For example, decentralization
enhances credibility because the diffusion of power makes it more difﬁcult for
outside pressures to be brought to bear on a central bank. The regional presence
helps a central bank to get its policy message out and to gather anecdotal and
specialized information on regional economies. Information gathering and dis-
semination are particularly important for central banks such as the Eurosystem
and the Federal Reserve System, whose currency areas span large and populous
regions. For this reason, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and the
Peoples Bank of China might proﬁtably restructure themselves as a system of
regional central banks.1
A regional presence also beneﬁts a central bank with responsibilities for
bank supervision and regulation, and the power to extend emergency credit
assistance to troubled ﬁnancial institutions. Specialized knowledge of local
economies, industries, and businesses is of use to bank examiners and helpful
in determining whether a troubled bank deserves emergency credit assistance.
1 In late 1998, the Peoples Bank of China announced its intention to establish nine provincial
branches.      
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Likewise, central banks that play a role in the provision of payments services
run far-ﬂung operations through their regional ofﬁces.
Last but not least, the diversiﬁcation of research within a system of central
banks brings a variety of analytical perspectives to policy deliberations that
is invaluable in our increasingly complex economy. Moreover, a system of
regional banks led by the center institution harnesses competitive forces to
encourage innovative thinking within the central bank.
The ﬁrst half of this article, which includes Sections 1 through 4, high-
lights the role played by the Reserve Banks in the Federal Reserve System.
The remainder of the article, Sections 5 through 8, offers some observations on
the new Eurosystem based on the experience of the Federal Reserve System.
There is a short concluding section.
Having spent 20 years as an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond, I welcome the opportunity to clarify my thinking on these matters.
I hope that my discussion of the Federal Reserve System helps the European
national banks and the European Central Bank to think about their respective
roles in the Eurosystem. Early in the century the Federal Reserve System looked
to European central banks for guidance in designing its institutional structure
and operating procedures. The Federal Reserve will be pleased if it can now
return the favor.
1. THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK PERSPECTIVE
The improvement over time in communication, information, and transportation
technologies has enhanced the role of Reserve Banks in the Federal Reserve
System. The United States has seen a deconcentration of metropolitan em-
ployment that appears to be the result of urban congestion and technologies
that make it increasingly possible to locate businesses away from traditional
urban centers.2 The tendency is toward an equalization of regional economic
activity.3 Think of the growth of California, Florida, and Texas, and the tremen-
dous growth in the South and Southwest. Atlanta, Georgia, has become a major
commercial center; Charlotte, North Carolina, is a major banking center; Seattle
is the home of aircraft and software production.
The growing dispersion of economic activity increases the value of local
information that Reserve Bank presidents bring to the Federal Open Market
Committee. The presence of Reserve Banks in the midst of the various re-
gional economies makes possible a deeper understanding of these than can be
acquired from Washington. Personal contacts built up over time create trusting
relationships that facilitate the timely acquisition of information about local
2 See, for example, Chatterjee and Carlino (1998).
3 Barro and Sala-´ ı-Martin (1992) present evidence of convergence within the United States.  
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businesses and markets. Personal contacts are particularly valuable in periods
of ﬁnancial stress when it is especially difﬁcult to know what is happening
in certain sectors. Reserve Banks tend to specialize in knowledge concerning
industries concentrated in their respective districts. For instance, the New York
Fed follows ﬁnancial markets generally, the Chicago Fed follows commodity
markets and heavy manufacturing, the Dallas Fed follows oil production and
developments in Mexico, etc.
Thanks to the progress in information and communication technology, Re-
serve Banks are no longer at an information disadvantage relative to the Federal
Reserve Board or the New York Fed with respect to general market infor-
mation. All receive news and data instantaneously from everywhere. Reserve
Bank presidents, in turn, contribute to policy discussions with speeches and
articles transmitted instantaneously around the world by wire services and by
the Internet.
Reserve Bank ofﬁcials are familiar with both their regional private sector
world and the world of the Federal Reserve Board. Reserve Banks help bridge
the two worlds. Responsibilities and pressures at the Board create a culture
very different from the private sector. The Board staff relies on aggregate
data and abstract concepts to think about the whole economy. Thinking at the
Board reﬂects consensus beliefs and attitudes, and is cautious in adopting and
even considering new ideas. Because the Board has ultimate responsibility for
much that is done in the System, it has little trouble attracting hard-working,
dedicated, and highly skilled employees. Yet because of the responsibility, the
pressure, the need for consensus, and the need to focus on abstractions and
aggregates, the Board staff can be distant from the private sector. This is
a manifestation of the remoteness described in the introduction that plagues
central bankers.
With important exceptions there is less ultimate responsibility for System
matters at Reserve Banks. On the other hand, there is opportunity for distin-
guishing one’s Reserve Bank from the others. This is a manifestation of the
competitive innovation, described in the introduction, that a system of central
banks promotes.
One of the Federal Reserve Board’s most important duties is to manage
relations with Congress. The Board also handles international relationships
and deals directly with large ﬁnancial institutions and national interest groups.
Board members testify and give speeches frequently. While these are critically
important responsibilities, such communications are nevertheless rather abstract
and remote.
Because of its regional presence and focus, the staff at Reserve Banks is
more engaged with the rank and ﬁle public. Much of what Reserve Banks
do involves direct relations with people in the private sector. For instance,
Reserve Bank ofﬁcials manage relations with their Boards of Directors made
up of private citizens. Ofﬁcials speak to local groups about Federal Reserve      
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policies and current economic conditions. Staff members supervise and exam-
ine banks, collect data on banking and regional business conditions, provide
ﬁnancial services, promote economic education, and help facilitate community
development. The staff at Reserve Banks understands core policy, regulatory,
and operational issues and knows how to explain these to its constituencies.
In short, Reserve Banks keep the central bank from becoming disembodied,
isolated, and out of touch.
2. FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE MEETINGS4
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meets every six weeks on aver-
age at the Federal Reserve Board in Washington. The meetings are attended by
the seven governors of the Federal Reserve System, the twelve Reserve Bank
presidents, and research directors and other staff members from the Reserve
Banks and the Board. The Chairman of the Board of Governors sets the agenda,
leads the discussions, shapes the policy decisions, and develops the consensus
to support the Committee’s policy actions.
The meetings routinely include a report from the open market desk at the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, a brieﬁng by the Board staff on current
economic and ﬁnancial conditions in the United States and abroad, a couple of
“go arounds” in which the governors and presidents present their views on the
economy and policy, and a discussion and vote on the intended federal funds
rate. Normally, an FOMC meeting lasts four to ﬁve hours, but twice a year
the Committee meets for two days to set annual target ranges for the monetary
aggregates and to consider longer-run procedural and strategic issues.
Even though all Reserve Bank presidents but the New York Fed president
vote on a rotating basis, all 19 members of the Committee participate on equal
terms at every meeting. The time for discussion among the members is, accord-
ingly, limited. More often than not, Committee members inﬂuence each other
incrementally by revisiting issues as time passes, rather than by exchanging
views at any particular meeting. Economic conditions usually do not call for a
change in the intended federal funds rate. The Committee uses such occasions
to prepare itself for possible future policy actions. Such “down time” affords
ample opportunity to consider strategic and procedural questions. All in all,
there is time for Committee members to educate and inﬂuence each other, and
to reach consensus. But, again, much of the back and forth among Committee
members takes place over time. In this regard, the verbatim written transcript
that is prepared and circulated after each FOMC meeting (but released with
a ﬁve-year lag) is of great help in enabling members to review each other’s
statements in detail.
4 See Meyer (1998).   
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The deliberative process works reasonably well in practice. The repeated
interaction creates a mutual understanding that enables a variety of geographical
and professional perspectives (academic economist, banker, business econo-
mist, businessperson, ﬁnancial market professional, government administrator,
lawyer, and regulator) to be brought to bear in making policy decisions.
Two related pitfalls have the potential to weaken the FOMC. First, the
bonding that takes place as a consequence of repeated meetings can cause
Committee members to begin to think alike. As a result, the FOMC could be
blindsided by a risk or side effect of a policy stance that it had not taken into
account. To some extent, that risk is diminished by the external community of
“Fed watchers” offering professional advice on monetary policy.
The sheer size of the FOMC reduces the likelihood that Committee mem-
bers will think alike. One of the great strengths of policy made by represen-
tatives from a system of regional central banks is the diversity and number
of points of view brought to the table. But the size of the FOMC actually
creates the second potential pitfall: a free rider problem. Recognizing that their
inﬂuence in the Committee may be small, members may be inclined to free-
ride on the preparations of others more interested, expert, or responsible for
monetary policy, such as the Chairman and the Board staff.
The free rider problem is dangerous because it has the potential to make
the effective size of the FOMC much smaller than the full Committee. Even
worse, free riding is hard to detect because free riders can continue to participate
with thoughtful-sounding statements. Widespread free riding would weaken the
Committee in much the same way as the tendency to think alike.
The Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board
Even though the Chairman has only one vote in the FOMC, he is preeminent
for a number of reasons. The Chairman and the other Board members are
appointed by the President of the United States, and the Chairman is named by
the President to lead the Federal Reserve System. The Chairman has command
of the large staff at the Federal Reserve Board. Most importantly, only he is
involved in every key central bank operation (monetary policy, bank supervi-
sion and regulation, ﬁnancial services, foreign exchange operations, relations
with Congress and the Treasury, and public relations). The Chairman is the
only member of the FOMC fully aware of all the potential interconnections in
what the Federal Reserve does. Consequently, no major decision can be taken
without the Chairman’s assent for fear of not having all the facts. For all these
reasons it is difﬁcult to challenge the Chairman’s leadership.
By the same token, a good Chairman is aware of the risks of excessively
centralizing power in his hands. For the reasons discussed above he must en-
courage diverse points of view in the FOMC. Central bankers worry about a
variety of risks to the economy and the Chairman must encourage Committee      
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members to bring their concerns to the table. The Chairman must help prioritize
the concerns and suggest a course of action to achieve the central bank’s goals.
Finally, the Chairman must mobilize the Committee to action. All in all, the
Chairman must use his preeminence to make the most of the diversity in the
FOMC while preserving the decisiveness needed to make monetary policy.
Reserve Bank Presidents at the FOMC
Broadly speaking, Reserve Bank presidents contribute to FOMC meetings in
two important ways. They make regular reports on their respective regional
economies, and they provide their own analysis of the national economy and
the policy options.
Regional information compiled by Reserve Banks for the FOMC in the
Beige Book is of great importance.5 But information in the Beige Book can be
stale by the time of an FOMC meeting. Presidents bring more timely informa-
tion to the meeting, including conﬁdential information from personal or other
sources not included in the Beige Book. Anecdotal information brought to the
FOMC can signal changing sentiment before it becomes evident in aggregate
data. Mutually supportive signals from various regions may help to identify or
conﬁrm a change in trend or a turning point in the aggregate data. It is par-
ticularly important that a central bank recognize and react promptly to turning
points in inﬂation and employment trends.
Besides the Chairman, the Board staff presents the most inﬂuential eco-
nomic analysis at FOMC meetings. The staff’s analysis is primarily presented in
two brieﬁng documents with which Committee members’ views are invariably
compared. The Greenbook summarizes national and international economic
conditions and presents a forecast; the Bluebook lays out the policy alternatives.
Although the brieﬁng books are comprehensive, the analysis of individual
members provides essential perspective. Governors and presidents alike con-
tribute substantively to the interpretation of current economic conditions and
the analysis of alternative policy options. Many important possibilities such as
the risk of an inﬂation or deﬂation scare or the chance of a crisis of conﬁdence
in ﬁnancial markets are particularly difﬁcult to assess and take account of in
econometric models. The state of consumer and business conﬁdence is also
difﬁcult to assess formally. Such issues are addressed in the statements of
Committee members themselves.
Economic analysis is a great equalizer among members of the FOMC. An
argument based on economic reasoning that can be challenged and debated
in the language of economics is ultimately more inﬂuential than an intuitive
assertion about the economy or policy, no matter who expresses it and how
strongly it is held.
5 See Balke and Petersen (1998).    
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3. ECONOMIC RESEARCH AT
FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS
Reserve Bank research departments are staffed with an average of 15 or so
research economists (except for the New York Fed, which has more than twice
as many). Economists graduate from top schools where they acquire the latest
analytical skills and an appreciation of how to think about macroeconomics,
monetary policy, and banking policy. For the most part, there is a belief in the
power and practical value of economic theory and empirical work, and a drive
to use economics to make good policy.
Reserve Banks are able to attract and retain good economists because they
offer a unique combination of opportunities. Above all, there is the opportunity
to prepare the bank president for FOMC meetings. In their role as policy ad-
visors, Reserve Bank economists acquire an intimate empirical understanding
of the macroeconomy and a broad understanding of policy issues. Economists
produce policy essays for the Bank’s Economic Review and may be encour-
aged to publish articles in professional economics journals. The best of these
essays may inﬂuence the way that the Federal Reserve, other central banks,
and academic economists think about policy. It is possible for a Reserve Bank
economist to become increasingly effective as a policy advisor while acquiring
a research reputation in the economics profession at large.
Reserve Bank research departments need not specialize. The expression of
alternative points of view is an important strength of a system of central banks.
Nevertheless, Reserve Bank research departments often develop a specializa-
tion. A Reserve Bank president may encourage research of one type or another;
or a particularly skillful economist may happen to make a department strong in
a particular sort of research. A Bank may also exploit a feature of its regional
economy or its operational responsibilities to develop a research advantage.
Differences of opinion among Federal Reserve economists are discussed at
regular System research meetings. From time to time, there are differences of
opinion involving essays in a Reserve Bank Economic Review. Reserve Banks
send review articles to the Board for a prepublication review. Ordinarily essays
beneﬁt from comments by the Board staff. On occasion, the Board staff may
recommend against publication because an article is thought to be technically
ﬂawed or because the article takes a position regarded as inconsistent with
System policy. Conﬂicts arise because the Board staff prepares speeches and
testimony for the Chairman and other Board members in which the Federal
Reserve explains current policies to Congress and others. Policy essays pub-
lished by a Reserve Bank that implicitly or explicitly question current policies
may be a nuisance or worse from the perspective of the Board.
Obviously, Reserve Bank economists could be prevented from publishing
essays critical of current policy. But that would deny the public the work
of economists most knowledgeable about central banking. It would leave the       
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ﬁeld wide open to others less familiar with the subject. Besides, policy essays
reveal a healthy open debate within the Federal Reserve System. In keeping
with the mission of a central bank to worry about the economy and policy, it
is helpful to have policy questioned by enterprising economists at the Reserve
Banks. Furthermore, the best essays facilitate policy advances by suggesting
alternatives.
Ultimately, a Reserve Bank has both the incentive and the ability to dis-
cipline the output of its economists. The Reserve Bank itself has the most
to lose by publishing a poor essay in its Review. Reserve Bank research is
regularly presented at Federal Reserve System committees and at academic
conferences and seminars. Research directors have ample opportunity to judge
the professional reception of a particular piece of research prior to publishing
it in the Bank’s Review.
4. PUBLIC INFORMATION
The modern era of monetary policy at the Federal Reserve began when Chair-
man Paul Volcker took responsibility publicly for inﬂation in the early 1980s,
and subsequently brought it down. This was a watershed event because before
that Federal Reserve ofﬁcials and much of the public, too, generally blamed
inﬂation on a variety of causes beyond the central bank’s control. Since then, the
public has come to understand that Federal Reserve monetary policy determines
the trend rate of inﬂation over any substantial span of time.
The acceptance of the responsibility for low inﬂation by the Federal Re-
serve greatly elevated the importance of public information and communication
in the policy process. Previously, the Federal Reserve preferred to operate in
the background and out of the limelight. The public thought that important
economic policy decisions were made elsewhere, and the Fed felt relatively
little need to communicate with the public about its policy intentions. All that
changed after the disinﬂation initiated by Chairman Volcker, for two reasons.
First, the Fed thrust itself into the limelight with inﬂation-ﬁghting policy ac-
tions that raised interest rates and weakened economic activity in order to
bring down inﬂation. Second, the Fed realized that bringing down inﬂation and
maintaining price stability would be easier if the Fed had credibility for low
inﬂation. Thus, the public became more interested in what the Fed was doing,
and Fed ofﬁcials came to see communication with the public as a tool useful
for building credibility.
The Fed has two primary public information objectives with respect to
monetary policy.6 A consensus has emerged among monetary economists and
central bankers that some sort of explicit mandate for low inﬂation is beneﬁcial.
6 See Goodfriend (1997).  
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Yet, Congress has not mandated in a clear way that the Fed place a priority on
low inﬂation. Consequently, Fed ofﬁcials bear the burden of responsibility for
educating the public about the beneﬁts of low inﬂation. Second, the guiding
tactical principle of monetary policy is to preempt inﬂation, or deﬂation, for
that matter. A well-timed preemptive increase in the intended federal funds rate
is nothing to be feared. For instance, the 1994 monetary tightening was almost
certainly necessary to keep inﬂation from ending the business expansion. If the
Fed is to successfully maintain price stability, it must create an understanding
of the need for policy to be preemptive; and the Fed must build a consensus
for speciﬁc preemptive policy actions when they are needed.
The regional presence of the Reserve Banks is a great advantage in getting
the Fed’s message out to the public. The participation of Reserve Bank pres-
idents in the FOMC puts them in great demand as speakers in their districts.
Economists and other staff members at the Reserve Banks also carry the Fed’s
message to the public. Reserve Banks produce a variety of literature aimed at
educating the public about the Federal Reserve. There are extensive economic
education programs through which the staff at Reserve Banks explains monetary
policy to schoolteachers and college professors.
Sometimes market participants complain that speeches by members of the
FOMC complicate the business of understanding the Fed’s current thinking. As
mentioned above, the great strength of the Federal Reserve System is that it
brings a number of different points of view to the FOMC. There is no reason
why the public should not hear these diverse views.
Markets know that the Chairman, and only the Chairman, speaks for the
whole FOMC, and the Chairman’s rhetoric is understood to represent the current
consensus thinking of the FOMC on policy. The Chairman makes use of his
numerous appearances before Congress and elsewhere to update or elaborate
upon the current thinking of the FOMC. Moreover, the FOMC announces any
change in its intended federal funds rate immediately after any meeting in
which the rate is changed. Minutes of each FOMC meeting, released shortly
after the following meeting, give a fairly comprehensive idea of the concerns
and inclinations of Committee members, though without individual attribution.
Included with the minutes is the policy directive from the FOMC to the open
market desk. The directive contains “symmetry language” that indicates any
inclination on the part of the Committee as a whole to be more concerned with
the risk of inﬂation or recession over the next few weeks. The minutes also
contain the voting record and any statements of dissent expressed by members
of the FOMC.
The public does not seem to mistake the personal views of individual mem-
bers for information about the FOMC as a whole. Transparency of a Committee
member’s views, rather than secrecy, seems more likely to build understanding
and credibility for the Federal Reserve over time. Not to air differences among
Committee members would deprive markets of useful information, and it would       
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put the public at a permanent disadvantage in understanding monetary policy.
It is worth emphasizing that the Federal Reserve’s most effective voice is
that of its Chairman. The great respect accorded the Fed Chairman is largely
due to his own analytical ability and experience, and the informational and
analytical support of the capable Board staff. A good measure of credit is no
doubt due to recent monetary policy successes. But an important source of the
Chairman’s personal credibility probably comes from the fact that he represents
the views of the diverse members of the FOMC. If the public were to believe
that the Chairman was acting alone, the public would be more inclined to worry
that the Chairman could be co-opted, i.e., that he might take policy actions for
political rather than economic reasons. The Chairman’s credibility and inﬂu-
ence would suffer accordingly. Even here, the regional nature of the Federal
Reserve System plays an important role. The Federal Reserve Chairman needs
the FOMC as much as the Committee needs its Chairman.
5. THE EUROSYSTEM7
The Eurosystem shares the basic structure of the Federal Reserve System. The
Eurosystem consists of the European Central Bank (ECB) headquartered in
Frankfurt am Main, more or less the equivalent of the Federal Reserve Board,
and 11 national central banks (NCBs), which are like the 12 Federal Reserve
Banks. Monetary policy in the Eurosystem is made by the Governing Council
(the equivalent of the FOMC). The Governing Council includes six members
of an Executive Board housed at the ECB (the rough equivalent of the seven-
member Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) and the governors
of the 11 national central banks. The President of the ECB chairs the Governing
Council, playing a role similar to the Chairman of the Board of Governors.
Power in the Eurosystem is more decentralized than in the Federal Reserve
System. First of all, the governors of the NCBs all vote on policy matters in
the Governing Council on each occasion. The seven members of the Board of
Governors and the New York Fed president vote all the time in the FOMC,
but the other 11 Reserve Bank presidents have only four votes on a rotating
basis. As is the case in the FOMC, policy decisions in the Governing Council
require a simple majority vote.
Secondly, the Board of Governors exercises more power in the Federal
Reserve System than the ECB does in the Eurosystem. For instance, the Board
of Governors exercises general supervision over the Reserve Banks: the Board
approves Reserve Bank budgets, approves the appointment of Reserve Bank
7 European Union (1995) contains the Maastricht Treaty, which, in turn, contains the lan-
guage governing the structure, administration, and objectives of the Eurosystem. Wynne (1999)
summarizes the documentation authorizing the establishment of the Eurosystem.  
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presidents, and appoints three of nine directors at each Reserve Bank, including
the chairman. In contrast, the Maastricht Treaty gives the NCB governors con-
trol over the terms and conditions of employment of the staff at the ECB. The
NCBs are ﬁnancially independent of both the ECB and their respective national
governments. Decentralized control, the so-called principle of subsidiarity, is
enshrined in the preamble of the Maastricht Treaty.
Even the ECB itself is more decentralized than the Board of Governors.
For instance, the Economic and Research Directorates, which employ the bulk
of the ECB’s professional economists, do not report to the President of the
ECB but to another member of the Executive Board. The fact that there is
no Chief Executive of Europe to give his assent to the President of the ECB
and other Executive Board members, as in the United States, probably makes
for a weaker ECB within the Eurosystem. The NCB governors are appointed
by their respective national governments, without approval of the Executive
Board.
On the objectives for monetary policy, the Maastricht Treaty states un-
ambiguously that the primary objective of the Eurosystem shall be to maintain
price stability. Although the treaty obliges the Eurosystem to support the general
economic policies of the European Union, that support is to be without prej-
udice to the objective of price stability. Accordingly, the Eurosystem mandate
is considerably more deﬁnite than the objectives given in the Federal Reserve
Act.
The Maastricht Treaty safeguards the independence of the Eurosystem. The
Eurosystem charter is an international treaty that cannot be revoked without
unanimous consent of the signatories. Moreover, the treaty itself actually tells
the Eurosystem not to take instructions from other institutions in the European
Union. The greatest threat to the Eurosystem’s independence and the pursuit of
price stability could come from the ambiguity in the treaty on exchange rate
policy, which is to be established by the European Council. It is not completely
clear how a conﬂict between exchange rate and price stability objectives would
be settled.
On transparency, the Maastricht Treaty mandates that the ECB publish
quarterly and annual reports. Executive Board members have signaled their
willingness to testify regularly before the European Parliament. The ECB in-
tends to keep the public informed of its policy actions and thinking through
press conferences, speeches, and other regular publications. The President of the
ECB holds a press conference to discuss monetary policy immediately after one
of the two Governing Council meetings held each month. Notably, the treaty
speciﬁes that the proceedings of the meetings shall be conﬁdential, but that the
Governing Council may decide to make the outcome of its deliberations public.
For now, the Eurosystem does not coordinate and centralize bank super-
vision and regulation, or emergency credit provision. NCBs carry on in these
areas according to their respective national policies. This, of course, differs from      
M. Goodfriend: The Role of a Regional Bank 19
Federal Reserve practice, where the Board exercises control over emergency
credit assistance and over the supervision and regulation of banks.
6. DECENTRALIZATION IN THE EARLY FEDERAL
RESERVE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EUROSYSTEM
The decentralized Governing Council described above is reminiscent of the
early Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve System. Established in-
formally in 1922 with 5 of the 12 Reserve Banks represented, the Committee’s
membership was broadened to include all 12 banks in 1930. The FOMC took
its modern form with the Banking Act of 1935, which gave the seven members
of the Federal Reserve Board a vote in open market policy for the ﬁrst time,
and reduced the Reserve Bank votes to ﬁve.
As is well known from the account by Milton Friedman and Anna
Schwartz, the decentralized structure of the Open Market Committee in the
1920s depended for its decisiveness on the leadership of Benjamin Strong,
Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.8 Governor Strong’s pow-
ers of persuasion, personal courage, and good judgment gave coherence and
purpose to Federal Reserve policy. After Governor Strong died in October 1928,
the Open Market Committee became unworkable. Without Strong’s leadership
the decentralized Open Market Committee made for drift and indecisiveness in
Federal Reserve policy.
The Governing Council of the Eurosystem appears to be susceptible to the
same indecisiveness as was the early Open Market Committee. A closer look,
however, shows why this is not likely to be the case.
First, the objectives of Federal Reserve monetary policy in the early years
were ambiguous. The United States was on a gold standard, and the Fed was
committed to defend the dollar price of gold. Yet for much of the 1920s Gov-
ernor Strong sterilized gold ﬂows and instead tried to stabilize the price level.9
In large part, Strong’s personal discretion substituted for the lack of an agreed
objective. The Eurosystem’s price stability mandate should go a long way
toward preserving the decisiveness of the Governing Council.
Second, it will take some time for the Eurosystem to develop and become
familiar with euro-area data. But on the whole, much better macroeconomic
data exist today than were available to the early Fed. This, too, should make
the Governing Council more decisive than the early Open Market Committee.
Third, today’s central banks can draw on the considerable theoretical and
practical knowledge that economists have accumulated since the early years of
the Fed. Central bankers have accumulated a good deal of practical knowledge
8 See Friedman and Schwartz (1963).
9 See Hetzel (1985).      
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themselves. The early Fed had little experience in managing monetary policy
and very little in the way of analytical skills at its disposal to help guide policy.
Fourth, professional central bank watchers today provide external advice
and discipline.10 This, too, should act against policy indecision. Fifth, the Fed
did not yet have the tradition of making the Chairman of the Board of Governors
the Chairman of the FOMC. In effect, the Fed then lacked an institutional leader
designated by the President of the United States. This was a great weakness in
a decentralized structure such as the Open Market Committee. The President of
the ECB is the designated leader. He is appointed by the European Council and
conﬁrmed by the European Parliament. In any case, it should be pointed out
that centralization of power in the FOMC such as occurred with the Banking
Act of 1935 did not guarantee good monetary policy, as the Great Inﬂation
from the late 1960s to the early 1980s showed.
To sum up, the analogy with the early Fed is far from conclusive. With the
help of the support systems described above, the Governing Council should be
able to strike a reasonable balance between decentralization and decisiveness.
7. SUBSIDIARITY AND ECB STAFFING
One problematic issue facing the Eurosystem is the nature of the control that
the NCBs will exercise over the stafﬁng budget of the ECB according to the
principle of subsidiarity. This is critical because, as the discussion of the Fed-
eral Reserve System makes clear, the Eurosystem cannot function effectively
without a sufﬁciently strong ECB. The ECB must perform certain tasks. For
instance, the ECB must represent the Eurosystem in its external relationships.
Presumably, only the President of the ECB can speak for the Governing Coun-
cil. Also, the ECB is the natural home for economists following the euro-area
economy as a whole. The ECB is a natural repository for euro-area data, and
its economists will assume primary responsibility (though by no means an
exclusive one) for following and interpreting these data for the Eurosystem.
In addition, the ECB needs a staff with analytical capabilities sufﬁcient to
support the President in his role as leader of the Eurosystem. Among other
things, the ECB’s staff, working with the staff at the NCBs, must devise an
analytical framework that can help the President of the ECB guide the members
of the Governing Council in their monetary policy deliberations.
The funding of the ECB staff must be authorized by the NCB governors.
Yet the NCBs lack the experience to judge the ECB’s priorities and needs.
The problem is twofold. First, NCBs know relatively little about managing
independent monetary policy. Second, NCBs have little experience as regional
10 See, for example, Begg et al. (1998).       
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banks in a system of central banks. The division of labor between the NCBs
and the ECB will have to be worked out gradually over time.
One hopes that the NCBs will agree to build up staff at the ECB fast
enough to provide the leadership that the Eurosystem needs. The analogy with
the Fed system makes clear that critical responsibilities should be borne by the
ECB. NCBs have responsibilities and comparative advantages of their own that
they should exploit for the beneﬁt of the Eurosystem.11
8. NATIONAL CENTRAL BANKS AND THE
CREDIBILITY OF THE EUROSYSTEM
The Eurosystem will establish full credibility for low inﬂation over time by
satisfying three conditions. First, the Eurosystem must manage monetary policy
competently. Second, the NCB governors and Executive Board members on the
Governing Council must learn to work together. Third, the Eurosystem must
build on its price stability mandate to broaden the public’s support for price
stability and the preemptive policy actions necessary to sustain it. The NCBs
play a central role in seeing that these three conditions are satisﬁed.
Competence
It seems fair to say that the Eurosystem’s expertise in maintaining price stability
derives in large part from the Bundesbank, which has had a long and successful
track record in managing independent monetary policy.12 Other NCBs have less
experience because for the most part they have chosen to ﬁx their exchange
rates to the Deutsche Mark. The Eurosystem adopted many of the Bundesbank’s
operational procedures to facilitate the transfer of the Bundesbank’s monetary
policy credibility to the Governing Council.
One signiﬁcant difference between the Eurosystem and its ﬁxed exchange
rate system predecessor led by the Bundesbank is that monetary policy will
now take account of euro-area aggregate data. Since those data are only re-
cently being created, little is known about their historical behavior or their
relationship to euro-area monetary policy. Until the Eurosystem becomes more
familiar with the new area-wide aggregates, the Governing Council needs to
rely on anecdotal regional information and the intimate knowledge that NCBs
possess of their own country’s data.
Finally, the NCBs have relatively large research departments compared to
the ECB and extensive operational experience in ﬁnancial and banking markets.
The competence of the Eurosystem will depend on the ability of the ECB to
11 See, for instance, Liebscher (1998).
12 See Deutsche Bundesbank (1999).      
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draw on the talents of staff at the NCBs, as need be, for the good of the system
as a whole.
Working Relationships on the Governing Council
Despite the safeguards in the Maastricht Treaty, the independence of the Eu-
rosystem is at risk because the regional members of the Governing Council
represent countries. Members could be inﬂuenced by their governments. Votes
on the Governing Council could be traded for those on other governing bodies
of the European Union. As mentioned above, the ambiguity on exchange rate
policy opens the door to political interference in monetary policy. Politically
motivated disputes could greatly complicate the business of the Governing
Council. Such conﬂicts could cause indecisiveness, inconsistent policy actions,
and a loss of credibility.
FOMC experience suggests a number of additional measures to prevent
the politicization of the Governing Council. First, a macroeconomic framework
should be developed to guide policy deliberations. The framework should be
rich enough to encompass a wide variety of views and sufﬁciently coherent to
provide the basis for prioritizing concerns and building a consensus for policy
actions. The Governing Council should utilize economic arguments disciplined
by the price stability objective to smoke out and defuse political rhetoric. Eco-
nomic reasoning is, to repeat, a great equalizer.
Second, the ECB President’s role in the Governing Council should be
strengthened so that he can guide the debate within the agreed upon framework.
The ECB President should act against free riding by encouraging members of
the Governing Council to prepare thoroughly and to participate actively. The
effectiveness of members would be enormously enhanced if each were allowed
to bring an economist advisor to the meetings. A verbatim transcript of the
meetings should be produced, if only for internal use, to facilitate the give and
take that must occur over time.
Third, the macroeconomic framework should be explained to the public
in some detail so that Eurosystem watchers can more readily exercise profes-
sional discipline on the internal debate.13 Minutes without individual attribution,
published shortly after each Governing Council meeting, would help focus Eu-
rosystem watchers on issues of concern to policymakers. Over the long run,
greater transparency can serve as a powerful safeguard against political inter-
ference.
Admittedly, the FOMC never had the potential for internal international
disputes that exists in the Governing Council. However, FOMC experience
suggests that the above-mentioned practices would facilitate the development
of productive professional working relationships in the Council.
13 See Issing (1998).    
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Broadening Public Support for the Eurosystem
The Bundesbank has an admirable monetary policy record in large part because
it always had the full support of the German public for its price stability ob-
jective. That support was there because the Bundesbank was associated in the
public’s mind with the postwar economic miracle that began in the late 1940s
at the time that the Deutsche Mark and the Bundesbank were created.
The European public has little natural afﬁnity for the new Eurosystem. As
was the case for the Federal Reserve System, the Eurosystem will have to earn
the public’s conﬁdence. If anything, public relations will be more difﬁcult for
the Eurosystem than they have been for the Federal Reserve System because
the euro area is made up of 11 different countries whose citizens speak many
different languages. The Eurosystem should make extensive use of the regional
presence of its NCBs to broaden the understanding of its mission and methods,
much as the Fed uses the Reserve Banks.
The Eurosystem has one big advantage over the Fed in explaining itself
to the public. In contrast to the Fed, whose mandate only exists in the Federal
Reserve Act and is ambiguous at that, the Eurosystem’s price stability mandate
is unambiguous and part of one of the founding documents of the European
Union.
9. SUMMARY
The main message of this paper is that regional (national) banks play an espe-
cially important role in central banks whose currency areas span a continent,
such as the Eurosystem and the Federal Reserve System. A regional presence
facilitates the acquisition of specialized information on the economy and po-
sitions the staff to reach out to the public with an explanation of the central
bank’s policy objectives and practices. Presidents (governors) of regional cen-
tral banks bring analytical diversity to the monetary policy committee. Above
all, a system of central banks promotes a healthy competition that stimulates
innovative thinking on operational, regulatory, research, and policy questions.
Federal Reserve experience teaches that a decentralized system needs a
strong center. Staff at the center needs to be large enough to support a strong
Chairman (President) of the system. The Chairman must be strong enough to
encourage diverse views in the policy committee and to build a consensus for
decisive and timely policy actions. The Chairman should exploit diversity and
promote decisiveness.
The key to success in the Eurosystem, in addition to the above-mentioned
points, is to establish good working relationships on the Governing Council.
To facilitate this, the staff at the center should take the lead in developing a
macroeconomic framework within which diverse policy views can be expressed
and debated productively. Personal advisors should accompany members to the    
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policy meetings. Verbatim transcripts should be prepared for internal use to fa-
cilitate an exchange of views over time. Minutes without individual attribution
should be published to present opposing views clearly, to focus central bank
watchers, and to guard against the potential for politically motivated policy
mistakes.
The Eurosystem and the Federal Reserve System will succeed in the long
run by broadening the public’s understanding and support for low inﬂation and
the preemptive policy procedures to maintain price stability. The way to do
that is to involve the Reserve Bank presidents (national central bank governors)
and their advisors fully in the policymaking process, and to utilize the system’s
regional presence to take the central bank’s monetary policy message to the
public.
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